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摘  要 








































These days, the global life insurance industry has been undergoing a hot wave of 
merge and acquisition (M&A). In china, though there hasn’t been any M&A between 
the life insurance companies by now, it will be tendency. 
Pricing is one of the most important steps in the process of M&A. But traditional 
pricing theories are of no application here because of the special characteristics of 
insurance companies. Based on it, this paper does some research on how to use suitable 
methods to determine the price of company in the position of being taken over. 
The author contends that the price of life insurance company will be determined by 
negotiation when the upper limit and lower limit of the price are set. Thereafter, the 
author will follow such logic to lay out this paper. 
Chapter one proves that, through theory and empirical evidence, the appraisal value of 
the target life insurance company, which is calculated by the actuarial appraisal 
method, is much closer to the market value than the result calculated by traditional 
methods. So the appraisal value here as the lower limit of the price can be obtained by 
the actuarial appraisal method as the appraisal value. 
Chapter two improves the traditional method to evaluate the value of synergy of M&A 
between the life insurance companies. At the same time, it evaluates the real value of 
the option imbedded in the M&A by the method used to calculate the financial option. 
The value of generalized synergy, which is constituted by the value of the synergy and 
the value of the real option, indicates the additional value from the M&A. The upper 
limit of the trade price can be attained by adding the value of the generalized synergy 
to the appraisal value.  
Chapter three simulates the negotiation under five conditions and determines M&A’s 
price between the lower limit and the upper limit by the means of game theory. 
Finally, this paper, based on the above research, resolves the problem of determining 
the price of M&A between the life insurance companies. Furthermore, the author 
draws a conclusion of the research and makes an outlook. 
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的寿险公司。1998 年至 2004 年，12 家全球性的寿险公司①收购了近 130 家寿险
公司，它们在全球寿险市场中所占份额因此从 1998 年的 19.8%上升至 2004 年的
28.2%。其中排名第一的美国 AIG 公司 2004 年保费收入 668 亿美元，在全球市
场占有的份额由 1998 年的 1.8%升至 2004 年的 3.6%，12 家全球寿险公司 2004





















较晚，且由于盈利模式的特殊性，往往在营业后 5 至 8 年才开始盈利，因此目前多数公司不符合上市条件。 





















至 2005 年 12 月 31 日，我国 大的寿险公司中国人寿总资产仅为 5584 亿元人
民币[2]，而德国安联保险集团总资产高达约 9979 亿欧元[3]，约合 95596 亿元人
民币；从资产利润率来看，中国人寿为 1.677%[2]，而 12 家全球性寿险公司中资



















































被称为“威斯顿模型” [8]。美国西北大学的 Alfred Rappaport 教授(1986)创立了公司
价值估值的自由现金流量贴现方法，又称为拉巴波特模型，是目前备受推崇且广




























权计算可以采用期权定价模型，典型的期权定价模型有 Black 和 Scholes（1973)
























































Von Neumann 和 Morgenstern（1944）两人对博弈论作了初步理论化，标志
着现代博弈论的开端 [26]。Tucker 于 1950 年定义了“囚徒困境”， Nash(1950，1951）
提出“纳什均衡”，两人的著作奠定了现代非合作博弈论的基石[27] [28]。






























目标公司独立经营的价值            
+ 并购产生的价值增值                                         价格上限 
   
并购价格                
 
目标公司独立经营的价值                                       价格下限                
                             图 1 公司并购价格决定图 
 
本文的研究思路如图 2 所示： 
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